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I. INTRODUCTION 
In their Lisbon summit in 2000, the Ministers of the European Council declared 
the goal of turning the European Union (EU) into “…the most competitive and 
dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world by 2010”. Among various 
targets to achieve this aim, the ratio of spending on research and development 
(R&D) activity was envisaged to increase from about 1.9 per cent in 2000 to three 
per cent in 2010. This target was emphasised again in the Barcelona meeting of 
the European Council in March 2002. As of 2007, the progress made towards 
meeting the Lisbon target on R&D has been slow and partly impeded by the 
politics of the allocation of expenditures in the EU budget. 
Historically speaking, the ratio of overall spending on R&D (public and 
private sources) to GDP in the EU has varied between 1.6 and 2 per cent since the 
beginning of 1980s. On the other hand, this ratio was as high as three per cent in 
Japan and generally above 2.5 per cent in the United States of America (US). 
Furthermore, the R&D spending to GDP ratio showed a secular increase both in 
the US and in Japan since 1996 while the R&D spending/GDP ratio stagnated in 
the EU. In this context, the ambitious R&D target set by the European countries is 
a signal of showing aggressive reaction – at least at the policy making level – first 
of all not to lag behind and then to overtake the R&D (location) leadership. If 
successful, this policy should help enhance the EU’s long-term economic growth 
potential.1 Putting the political and economic realism of the EU’s R&D targets 
aside, the EU’s stated willingness to make an aggressive move to match the 
already higher and increasing level of R&D activities in other countries has game-
theoretic implications.2 
                                                          
1
 The link between R&D activity and economic performance has long been recognised. 
Schumpeter, for example, put forth the process of “creative destruction” as an engine economic 
growth. More recently, R&D is formally given a central role in various variants of the endogenous 
growth theory as a driver of technological progress and long-term economic growth. The 
introduction of R&D as a driver of economic growth is an important development since it 
connects the economic growth process further with micro foundations, bearing implications for 
economic and public policy. See Lucas (1988), Romer (1990), Grossman and Helpman (1991), 
Grilliches (1992), Jones (1995), Aghion and Howitt (1998), and Segerstrom (1998). See also 
Lingens (2005) for a short discussion of the various versions (the first and second generations) of 
endogenous growth models and their policy implications. Goel and Rich (2005) provide a neat 
representation of the various aspects of the markets for R&D activity. 
2
 This is indeed a race for becoming an attractive R&D location since R&D activities in an 
economy (say, the EU, the US, or Japan) are undertaken not only by the nationals but also by the 
affiliates of foreign companies or as multinational research joint ventures. Kuemmerle (1999) 
studies the factors that determine the multinationals’ decision to invest in R&D abroad. The home-
base-exploiting (HBE) foreign direct investments (FDI) are found to be related to the relative 
attractiveness of the target market. The home-base-augmenting (HBA) FDI, on the other hand, 
correlates with the “…relative commitment to R&D of private and public entities in the target 
1
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While R&D races and games among firms (e.g., whether or not to 
innovate, when to innovate, formation of research joint ventures, etc.) and 
government policies towards the protection of inventions through patent policy 
are well-discussed in the industrial organisation literature, the direct relationship 
between the R&D activities of two countries or trading blocks has received less 
attention. An early exception is Scherer (1991) who examined the case of an 
“R&D race” between the US and Japan by means of bivariate Granger-causality 
tests. Scherer’s findings illustrated that the US firms reacted submissively, rather 
than aggressively, to the market penetration through R&D success by Japanese 
firms.3  
In this context, a submissive reaction by a firm (say, “A”) to the R&D 
efforts by others (say, “B”) is said to occur when “A” decides to reduce its R&D 
budget/efforts and shifts resources rather into non-R&D physical capital 
investments or into marketing and advertising in response to increased R&D 
effort by “B”. It is well documented in the business and industrial organisation 
literature that both R&D and marketing & advertising expenditures influence 
sales positively (e.g., Brenner and Rushton, 1989) and that there is a trade-off 
between R&D and marketing spending given the budget constraints (Ko, 2005). 
Thus, the submissive reaction discussed above might indeed be compatible with 
profit maximisation since what is at stake from a firm’s perspective is the sales 
figures. When a firm cannot (or decides not to) match the innovations made by 
the competitors, it may well increase its marketing & advertising spending in an 
attempt to increase its sales. The optimisation problem is, of course, a dynamic 
one. In the long-term, the myopic behaviour of shifting resources into marketing 
at the expense of R&D activity may lead to an inferior market position. 
Scherer’s (1991) finding that the US displayed a submissive reaction to 
increases in Japanese R&D has been supported by a number of subsequent studies 
(Park, 1995; Eaton and Kortum, 1996; and Blonigen and Slaughter, 2001; among 
                                                                                                                                                              
country, as well as with the level of human resource pool and the level of scientific achievement in 
relevant sciences.” (Kuemmerle, 1999: 18) 
3
 This example illustrates the conceptual suitability of Granger’s (1969) causality test and its 
variants as an empirical tool to investigate the nature of R&D races and spillovers, e.g. the 
aggressive vs. submissive reaction of one country to an increase in another country’s R&D efforts 
as well as the causal nature of the dynamic interaction between R&D and domestic economic 
activity. In the literature on R&D, there exist a number of studies that use Granger-causality tests 
to examine the interactions between physical capital accumulation and R&D activity, the 
relationship between total productivity growth and R&D at the aggregate or industry level, the 
effects of government policies and subsidies on private sector R&D, and the interactions between 
publicly and privately funded R&D. The following papers, among others, cover some of these 
topics: Verspagen (1995), Colombo and Garrone (1996), Frantzen (1998), Chiao (2001), 
Neelankavil and Alaganar (2003), Guellec and van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie (2003), Garcia-
Quevedo (2004), Kim and Lee (2004), and Greunz (2004). 
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others).4 More recently, Luintel and Khan (2004) used cointegration analysis and 
showed that international R&D spillovers could indeed be costly for the US. At 
the macro level, the cost of not responding to competitors’ R&D moves 
aggressively enough could be felt first as a loss of export share in the world 
markets for high technology goods (i.e., exports originating from R&D intensive 
industries). In the longer run, lagging behind in innovation activities should also 
reflect itself in relatively lower economic performance and productivity growth 
rates. 
Assessing the direction and the sign of the causality in R&D interactions 
between firms/countries is a complicated task since innovation activity leads to 
knowledge spillovers. These spillovers mainly stem from the imperfect 
appropriability of rents from innovations and diffuse through international trade, 
foreign direct investments, imitation, and labour mobility, among other channels.5 
As such, they occur not only within the home country but also across countries. 
Indeed, firms (domestic and/or foreign) may need to undertake catch up 
investments in R&D capability just to be able to make good use of the newly 
acquired technology from other firms since even sheer imitation requires the 
reverse engineering and reconstruction of the new product.6 This is in line with 
the argument that absorptive capacity plays a role in determining the extent of 
R&D spillovers (Carlsson and Mudambi, 2003). 
R&D is intrinsically a risky business. Increased spending on R&D 
activities does not guarantee a successful outcome – at least immediately. Thus, 
there exists a phenomenon of “dry holes” in the nature of R&D activities. Hence, 
the actual results of R&D games are not easy to predict due to the inherent 
uncertainties and information asymmetries associated with innovation activities. 
In sum, the possibility of an aggressive or a submissive reaction, coupled with the 
particularities of the nature of innovation activity, makes the sign of the effects of 
R&D efforts by a firm/country on the R&D efforts of others indeterminate. Then, 
a deeper look into the nature of causality in the recent history of the R&D 
interactions between the EU and the US is especially important in view of the 
EU’s decision to set explicit R&D spending targets to counter the US’s R&D 
lead. 
                                                          
4
 Bernstein and Mohnen (1998) estimate that there are positive R&D spillovers from the US to 
Japan but the conserve is not true. 
5
 See Coe and Helpman (1995), Coe, Helpman and Hoffmaister (1997), and Engelbrecht (1997a, 
1997b). See also Hejazi and Safarian (1999) and Lewer and van den Berg (2003) for a discussion 
of the impact of foreign trade and foreign direct investment on R&D spillovers and economic 
growth. 
6
 See, for example, Griffith, Redding, and van Reenen (2004). 
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This paper investigates the direction and the sign of causality in the 
international and domestic effects of R&D activity in the European Union (EU15 
– i.e., the EU before the enlargements in 2004 and 2007) and the United States of 
America in a multivariate framework. The analysis uses annual data on R&D 
productivity and labour productivity for the 1979-2002 period. In particular, we 
test: 1) whether changes in the R&D effort in the EU Granger-cause a response in 
the R&D activity by the US, and if so, whether the reaction is aggressive or 
submissive; 2) whether changes in the R&D effort in the US Granger-cause an 
R&D response in the EU, and if so, whether this reaction is aggressive or 
submissive. 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. We first discuss the data and 
the methodology. Then, we present the empirical results and puts them in 
perspective with respect to the observed productivity differentials between the US 
and the EU. Conclusions follow. 
II.  DATA AND METHODOLOGY  
II.A  DATA ISSUES 
The most commonly employed measure of productivity in the studies of R&D 
spillovers is total factor productivity (TFP). The TFP is calculated as a residual 
from an aggregate production function, such as Y = AKαL(1-α) , where Y is 
output, K is capital stock, L is labour input, A is a technology parameter, and 
0<α<1 is an elasticity parameter. In principle, one can obtain the estimates for 
TFP given the capital and labour input and the value of α. However, there are 
numerous assumptions behind this approach and the estimates of technological 
progress hence obtained are model dependent. In addition, any adjustments made 
by the national statistical agencies to account for quality changes in the capital 
stock may reduce or eliminate the impact of embodied technical progress. 
Furthermore, the estimation of capital stock is problematic in itself. Also, since 
we take the EU as an overall entity or a trading block of 15 countries, it might be 
erroneous to combine the capital stock figures calculated by different national 
statistical offices. 
Labour productivity is an alternative measure to TFP. It is not dependent 
on the assumptions of a theoretical model and it does not require capital stock 
estimates.7 Furthermore, various versions of labour productivity are used in 
making cross-country comparisons of economic growth and development. In a 
study of knowledge spillovers through trade, Falvey, Foster, and Greenaway 
                                                          
7
 See Sargent and Rodriguez (2000) and Lipsey and Carlaw (2004) for a further discussion the 
issues in the measurement of technological progress.  
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(2002, 2004) argue in favour of a productivity measure (GDP per capita), which is 
rather related to labour productivity than the TFP. In view of the above 
considerations, we also take labour productivity as a measure of domestic 
productivity developments in the EU and in the US. 
The choice of the R&D variable is made as follows. In the literature, the 
R&D activity is generally quantified in terms of expenditures. The EU indeed set 
its target in terms of R&D expenditure/GDP ratio. Nevertheless, there are a 
number of problems in using R&D expenditure data. First of all, the timing and 
the intensity of successful outcomes from increased R&D expenditures involve 
uncertainties. Secondly, the definition of what is “high tech” or “R&D-intensive 
good” changes overtime. Furthermore, the R&D expenditure figures from the 
OECD’s Main Science Indicators database contain many breaks, making them 
unsuitable for long-term time series analysis purposes. It may be possible to pool 
the R&D expenditure data for shorter periods of time, where they are consistent, 
and use panel data methods. Indeed, a large share of the studies in the literature 
that uses R&D expenditure data employs pooled time-series – cross-section data 
and conducts panel cointegration tests. The panel data techniques are useful 
especially when the span of data is too small to conduct meaningful cointegration 
and causality tests between the variables of interest. However, they are subject to 
more stringent assumptions about the data generating processes due to pooling. In 
a study of R&D spillovers across G10 countries, Luintel and Khan (2004: 909) 
conclude that it is not appropriate to pool their data since “…long-run spillover 
elasticities differ significantly among sample countries; and panel estimates, in 
general, do not correspond to country-specific parameters. Thus, panel tests 
appear to conceal important cross-country differences in knowledge spillovers.”  
Since this paper is particularly aiming at causally investigating the foreign 
and domestic effects of R&D activities in the EU and in the US, we need 
consistently compiled time series data with a reasonably long span to run the 
multivariate Granger-causality tests. Therefore, we make use of the University of 
Groningen’s “Growth and Development Centre, 60-Industry Database 
(GGDC_60), version February 2005”. The GGDC_60 reports national-accounts-
based value-added data, standardised by the ISIC (revision 3) classification 
system, for a large number of OECD countries for the 1979-2002 period. Under 
the ISIC rev. 3, “Section 73” is the “research and development” activity from all 
sources.8 We select this entry to as a measure of the economy-wide R&D activity. 
Both the value-added in R&D activities and in the total economy are 
measured in real terms (at 1995 constant prices). They are further adjusted for 
differences in employment levels and indexed as 1995=100 to make the data 
comparable across countries and in levels. The resulting four variables are the real 
                                                          
8
 The dataset is available from http://www.ggdc.net (60-Industry Database) 
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value-added per worker (labour productivity) in the R&D activities and in the 
total economies of the EU (EURD, EULP) and the US (USRD, USLP). Since 
labour productivity growth is also due to other factors than R&D, we also take the 
deviations of these series from their 1979-2002 trend growth. Figures 1-4 show 
the graphs of the series in question.  
  FIGURE 1. LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY IN THE US (USLP) 
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FIGURE 2. R&D PRODUCTIVITY IN THE US (USRD) 
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As Figures 1 and 2 show, there is a coincidence between the general 
productivity slump (1989 – 1998) in the US and the slump in the real value-added 
per worker in R&D activities (1985 – 1996). Furthermore, there appears to be a 
leading effect from R&D activities. In the case of EU, the situation is not clear 
6
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(Figures 3 and 4). However, a time-series analysis of the lead-lag relationships 
may still tell a different story than the visual first impressions. 
FIGURE 3. LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY IN THE EU15 (EULP)  
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    FIGURE 4. R&D PRODUCTIVITY IN THE EU15 (EURD) 
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When it comes to the relationship between the deviation of the value-
added in R&D activities per worker from its long-run trend in the US and the EU, 
7
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there indeed appears to be a negative relationship.9 This is illustrated as a 
scatterplot with a linear regression line in Figure 5.  
FIGURE 5. SCATTERPLOT OF THE EU’S AND THE US’S R&D 
PRODUCTIVITIES 
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It should be noted that Figure 5 displays the bivariate relationship between 
the productivity in the EU’s and the US’s R&D activities without controlling for 
any third variables. The direction of causality cannot be deduced by using 
(partial-) correlation analysis. Then, the question is whether the observed negative 
relationship between the USRD and EURD is spurious or whether it shows the 
existence of a submissive reaction by one of the players – e.g., the US’s R&D 
hurting the EU’s or vice versa. 
                                                          
9
 A negative correlation between the R&D activities of the EU and the US is also reflected by 
other indicators. For instance, the EU’s average share in the highly cited (top 1%) publications 
increased from 35.42% to 37.12% between the 1993-1997 and 1997-2001 periods, while the US’s 
share declined from 37.46% to 34.86% in the same periods. Similarly, the EU’s share of citations 
in the top 1% cited publications increased from 36.57% to 39.3% and the US’s share registered a 
decline from 39.3% to 32.85% between the 1993-1997 and 1997-2001 periods. See King (2004) 
for further details and comparisons.  
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II.B METHODOLOGY: TESTING FOR GRANGER-CAUSALITY IN A 
MULTIVARIATE FRAMEWORK 
Granger’s (1969) definition of causality between two weakly stationary stochastic 
variables X and Y is as follows. X is said to Granger-cause Y if and only if Y can 
be better predicted by using X in addition to the history (lags) of Y and all other 
relevant information. In the bivariate case, this definition takes the following form 
in practice:  
εγβα 1tj-t1j
q
1=j
j-t1j
p
1=j
1t +  x+y+=y ΣΣ (1) 
εγβα tj-tj
s
1=j
j-tj
r
1=j
t +  x+y+=x 2222 ΣΣ (2) 
where: α’s are constant terms; β’s and γ’s are parameters to be estimated; p, q, r, 
and s are lag-lengths; and εit are well-behaved error terms. In equation (1) if Σγ1j 
≠ 0, then X Granger-causes Y. Granger-causality from Y to X can be similarly 
defined. The practical problem with the above equations is how to choose the 
optimal lag-lengths (p,q,r,s). This is an important consideration since the results 
from Granger-causality tests are generally sensitive to the specification of the test 
equation. Granger (1969) used fixed lags, i.e., p=q=r=s. In later versions of the 
Granger’s causality test, flexible lag-lengths were used, e.g., Hsiao (1979, 1982). 
In this study, we use the subset autoregression and transfer function approach 
which includes only the significant lags in the specification of equations (1) and 
(2) as suggested by Penm and Terrel (1984) and Kang (1989). Using the subset 
transfer function methodology has a further relevance in the context of empirical 
modelling of the effects of R&D activity. As discussed earlier, there might exist 
“dry holes” in the relationship between R&D and economic activity (Rouvinen, 
2002). That is, not every increase in R&D effort necessarily immediately reflects 
itself into higher productivity in the economy. At times, there might be no visible 
effects, or the effects are small and unclear. But, they accumulate (e.g., learning 
effects even from unsuccessful attempts) and may show themselves after a long 
lag, or perhaps after “…some promising discovery.” (Rouvinen, 2002: 125). 
Then, the subset transfer function approach that suppresses the insignificant lags 
and allows for the possibility of including distant but significant lags into the 
specification is conceptually well-suited for empirically addressing the 
phenomenon of “dry holes”. 
For the selection of the optimal lag specifications in subset autoregressions 
and subset transfer functions, we use Schwarz’s (1978) “Bayesian Information 
Criterion (SBIC)”. SBIC is given by the formula: SBIC = (ESS/T)*T(k/T), where 
ESS is the error sum of squares from estimation of the model in question, T is the 
9
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sample size, and k is the number of estimated parameters in the model. 
Conceptually, SBIC is derived from Bayesian foundations. As such, it is an 
attempt to find the most probable model for the data at hand.  
The detection of Granger (non-) causality from X to Y even in a bi-variate 
framework has important implications. According to Hsiao (1982), for X to be a 
direct cause of Y, X should cause Y in all settings: bi- and multi-variate. 
Furthermore, if X causes Y only indirectly via another variable Z, X should still 
cause Y when Z is not in the equation. Nevertheless, if Z is a common cause of 
both X and Y, and if there is no other direct or indirect relationship between X 
and Y, one may detect Granger-causality between X and Y in the absence of Z. 
The detected causality in this case would be spurious. In our study, we start with 
the examination of Granger-causality in the bivariate case, but extend the analysis 
into a 4-variable framework subsequently. Still, we qualify our findings as prima 
facie since the missing cause problem is not necessarily solved in a multivariate 
framework.  
Analysing the causal relationships among the variables of interest in a 
multivariate framework is a complex task due to any indirect linkages and 
possible spurious relationships. For example, consider the case where a variable X 
Granger-causes Y in a trivariate system (i.e., in the presence of a distinct variable 
Z) but not in a bivariate relationship. Hsiao (1982) calls this as “Type I spurious 
causality”. This may be a misnomer since the Z variable indeed acts as a catalyst 
or as a co-requisite condition for the causal relationship between X and Y to hold. 
In order to conclude in favour of non-causality from X to Y in a multivariate 
setting, X should not cause Y in a bivariate setting and, in addition, X should not 
be a (direct) cause of any variable that in turn causes Y. Further definitions can be 
found in Hsiao (1982). See also the Appendix to this study for a parameterised 
extension of Hsiao’s (1982) definitions in a 4-variable framework.  
Another complication that arises in testing for Granger-causality is the 
following possibility: even if the introduction of X (say, with lags 1 and 2) over 
the best univariate specification for Y leads to a lower forecast error variance of Y 
(i.e., X Granger-causes Y), the estimated coefficients on lag 1 and 2 may carry 
opposite signs and cancel out, or their sum may not be statistically significant. In 
this case, it would be wrong to conclude that X does not cause Y since the 
conditions for Granger-causality are still fulfilled. This case, discussed in Sturm 
and De Haan (1998) among others, is called “neutrality”. 
In addition, the following case may also be encountered in a 4-variable 
system consisting of Y, X, W, and Z. That is, one runs the Granger-causality test 
between X and Y first in a bivariate relationship, secondly in a system when W is 
present (X,Y,W), thirdly in a system when Z is present (X,Y,Z), and finally when 
all four variables are in the system (X,Y,W,Z). Now, let us assume that X is found 
to be a direct cause of Y (that is, X casuses Y in all settings), but the sign of the 
10
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estimated coefficients changes from specification to specification. Then, one must 
conclude that the relationship between X and Y is not robust in different 
specifications despite the findings of direct causality in the Granger-Hsiao sense. 
III. EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
Following the above discussion of the data and the methodological details and 
problems, we now turn to the examination of the Granger-causal links between 
the four variables described and graphically displayed earlier: EURD, EULP, 
USRD, and USLP. We are especially interested in finding out whether there are 
cases of “direct causality” between these variables. In running the Granger-
causality tests, we first test for the time series properties of the variables in 
question using the augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF), Phillips-Perron (PP), and the 
KPSS unit root tests. Note that the null hypothesis is non-stationarity in the ADF 
and PP tests, while the KPSS takes the null hypothesis as stationarity. The test 
results shown in Table 1 indicate that all series are stationary.  
TABLE 1.  UNIT ROOT TEST RESULTS 
EURD EULP USRD USLP 
ADF (levels) -2.781663*** 
[N,4] 
-3.514640*** 
[N,1] 
-3.300224*** 
[N,0] 
-1.956874**   
[N,4] 
ADF (1st Differences) -3.681901*** 
[N,0] 
-2.435185**   
[N,0] 
-7.207506*** 
[N,0] 
-3.786142*** 
[N,0] 
PP (Levels) -2.040573**   
[N,3] 
-2.413733**   
[N,2] 
-3.247849*** 
[N,1] 
-1.176495       
[N,2] 
PP (1st Differences) -3.721546*** 
[N,2] 
-2.410303**   
[N,2] 
-8.501124**   
[N,6] 
-3.789211*** 
[N,1] 
KPSS (Levels) 0.160017         
[C,3] 
0.116081         
[C,3] 
0.170184        
[C,2] 
0.145178        
[C,3] 
KPSS (1st Differences) 0.324349*       
[C,2] 
0.290246         
[C,2] 
0.270488        
[C,7] 
0.432268        
[C,2] 
ADF: Augmented Dickey Fuller test, PP: Phillips – Perron Test, KPSS: Kwiatkowski-Phillips-
Schmidt-Shin test. N: no trend and no intercept in the specification, C: intercept but no trend in the 
specification. The numbers in the square brackets indicate the lag-length in the ADF test, and the 
bandwidth in the PP and KPSS tests. (***), (**), and (*) indicate, respectively that the null 
hypothesis can be rejected at 1%, 5% and 10% statistical significance levels.   
Next, we examine the bivariate causal relationships using the system 
shown in equations (1) and (2). The generic variable names X and Y are replaced 
with a pair of the EURD, EULP, USRD, USLP variables in the actual test. The 
lag-lengths are selected through a subset autoregression and transfer function 
methodology as discussed earlier. The maximum lag-length was set to six. This is 
in line with Ravenscraft and Scherer (1982) who calculate that the mean lag for 
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the R&D efforts to show their effects (on industrial profitability) is 4 to 6 years. 
Our choice has also been necessitated by the available number of observations 
(1979-2002, i.e., 23 years) and the number of variables (four) in our study. For 
example, if we were to estimate a vector autoregression (VAR) that is formed 
without a subset autoregression and transfer function methodology, we would be 
able to use at most 4 lags – leaving only 2 degrees of freedom in each equation, 
not a healthy choice for making statistical inferences. Nevertheless, the subset 
methodology eliminates the insignificant or redundant parameters and leads to 
more efficiency in estimation in addition to allowing for the inclusion of more 
distant but possibly significant lags in the specification. Table 2 shows the details 
of the resulting specifications and the SBIC values in the bivariate model. The 
headers “Caused Variable” and the “Causing Variable” can be read as the Y and 
X variables, respectively, in line with equations (1) and (2) 
TABLE 2.  BIVARIATE GRANGER-CAUSALITY TEST RESULTS 
Caused 
variable: 
Univariate 
Specification 
SBICUV Causing 
variable: 
Transfer    Sign & 
Function    Sig. Level 
SBIC2V 
EURD 1,4,5 4.673850 EULP 4                  (+) 4.735744 
EURD 1,4,5 4.673850 USRD 2                  (+)** 4.512524 ‡ 
EURD 1,4,5 4.673850 USLP 1,6               (+)*** 4.585471 ‡ 
EULP 1,4 2.563014 EURD 1,3,4            (-) 2.501711 ‡ 
EULP 1,4 2.563014 USRD 1,6               (+)*** 2.401400 ‡ 
EULP 1,4 2.563014 USLP 2,5               (-) 2.511896 ‡ 
USRD 6 5.952995 EURD 1,3               (-)*** 5.664985 ‡ 
USRD 6 5.952995 EULP 3,4,6            (-)*** 5.871018 ‡ 
USRD 6 5.952995 USLP 1,5,6            (-)*** 5.633191 ‡ 
USLP 1,5 2.692500 EURD 1,2,3            (-)** 2.336714 ‡ 
USLP 1,5 2.692500 EULP 1,2,3            (-) 2.693477 
USLP 1,5 2.692500 USRD 3                  (+) 2.725659 
Source: Author’s calculations. Detailed estimation results and regression diagnostics are available 
upon request.  (***), (**), and (*) indicate respectively that the coefficient(s) is/are (jointly) 
significant at 1%, 5% and 10% statistical significance levels. (‡) indicates that the SBIC2V < 
SBICUV for the entry in question.  
A brief explanation about the entries in Table 2 is in order. For example, 
the entry for the case of EURD and USRD (the second row in the table) should be 
read as follows:  EURDt = α + β1EURDt-1 + β2EURDt-4 +  β3EURDt-5 + 
β4USRDt-2, with the resulting univariate (for EURD) Schwarz BIC (SBICUV) 
value of 4.673850 and a subset bivariate transfer function (TF) SBIC value 
(SBIC2V) of 4.512524. Since the SBIC2V < SBICUV, the USRD can be said to 
Granger-cause EURD in a bivariate specification. The other entries can be 
interpreted similarly. 
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Table 3 presents the qualitative summary of the results from the bivariate 
Granger-causality. In reading the entries in Table, it should be noted that “None” 
means no Granger-causality is detected and (.) indicates there is Granger-causality 
between the variables in question and shows the sign of the relationship in 
parentheses, where the sign is confirmed as a result of joint-significance tests 
(Wald) in case of multiple lags entering the specification. A more complicated 
case arises when there is indeed Granger-causality from the causing variable to 
the caused one, but the signs on the lags of the causing variable do not turn out to 
be jointly significant (as they positive and negative values may have cancelled out 
each other). This case is denoted by “Neutrality”.  
TABLE 3.  SUMMARY OF THE RESULTS FROM THE BIVARIATE 
GRANGER-CAUSALITY TESTS 
← 
Causing Variables 
Caused Variables ↓ EURD EULP USRD USLP 
EURD --- None (+) (+) 
EULP Neutrality --- (+) Neutrality 
USRD (-) (-) --- (-) 
USLP (-) None None --- 
Source: Author’s calculations based on the results reported in Table 2. 
The qualitative findings from the bi-variate Granger-causality tests provide 
a first glimpse into the causal relationships among our set of variables. First of all, 
the impact of an increase in the productivity of R&D activity (above the long-run 
trend) in the EU is found to have negative effects on the R&D and overall labour 
productivity in the US. On the other hand, the EU appears to be positively 
affected from an increase in the US’s R&D productivity. Similar to the findings 
on the effects of Japanese R&D efforts on the US, the R&D efforts in the EU also 
appear to be costly for the US. 
When it comes to the effects of R&D on the domestic sectors, no 
significant or persistent effect is found either in the EU or in the US. In addition, 
the impact of an increase in labour productivity (above the long-run trend) does 
not appear to spill into the R&D efforts in the case of EU. In the US, the impact is 
indeed negative. Since labour productivity may increase also due to 
improvements in human capital quality or substitution of physical capital for 
labour, the firms may be in a position to cut down their R&D budgets and shift 
resources into marketing and advertising and/or compete in the domestic or 
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international markets through productivity increases brought about by other 
means. Finally, there is no spillover effect from the EU’s labour productivity on 
the US. There is some indication of spillovers from the US labour productivity to 
the EU’s, but the overall effect is neutral. 
Keeping these findings in mind, we now extend the causal analysis into 3- 
and 4-variable settings. The following are the trivariate systems to be 
investigated: 1) EULP, EURD, USRD, 2) EULP, EURD, USLP, 3) EULP, 
USRD, USLP, and 4) EURD, USRD, USLP. In the 4-variable system, we 
estimate four models, each one explaining one of the above variables (as the 
dependent variable) on its own lags and on the lags of the three remaining 
variables. 
In multivariate models, the choice of the lag-lengths and thus determining 
the optimal model specification becomes rather complicated. We addressed this 
problem as follows. First, we used the bivariate specifications (say, EULP and 
EURD) as the basis to introduce the third variable (say, USRD). The optimal 
specification was found through minimising the SBIC criterion resulting from 
different lag-length specifications. This procedure was repeated once more by 
changing the order of the variables in the bivariate specification (i.e., EURD and 
EULP with USRD again being the third variable), and the resulting SBIC value 
was noted. Then, comparing the SBIC values from the two models, we picked the 
one with the lowest value as the basis for the 4-variable model. This is in line with 
the principle that the optimal specification should be robust to variable orderings. 
Next, we entered the fourth variable into the systems. A similar methodology to 
the trivariate case is again used to select the model with the lowest SBIC value. 
The equations of the 4-variable case and a description of the conditions to 
evaluate the causal relationships among the variables are given in the Appendix. 
The optimal specifications and the resulting SBIC values from the trivariate and 
4-variate models are presented in Tables 4 and 5, respectively. 
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TABLE 4.  TRIVARIATE GRANGER-CAUSALITY TEST RESULTS 
A) EULP, EURD, USRD 
EULP(t-i)  Sign EURD(t-i)  Sign USRD(t-i)  Sign SBIC3V
EULP(t) 1,4 1,3,4             (-) 2,3,4,6         (-) 1.821814 
EURD(t) 1,5,6            (-) 1,4,5 1,2,3,6         (+) 3.973010 
USRD(t) 6                  (-) 1,3                (-) 6 4.871124 
B) EULP, EURD, USLP 
EULP(t-i)  Sign EURD(t-i)  Sign USLP(t-i)  Sign SBIC3V
EULP(t) 1,4 1,3,4            (N) 1,2,4,6        (N) 2.437927 
EURD(t) 1,4               (N) 1,4,5 1                 (+) 4.292234 
USLP(t) 2                  (+) 1,2,6            (+) 1,5 2.200939 
C) EULP, USRD, USLP 
EULP(t-i) Sign USRD(t-i)  Sign USLP(t-i)  Sign SBIC3V
EULP(t) 1 1,2,3,4,5,6   (-) 2,5              (+) 1.540702 
USRD(t) 6                  (-) 6 3,6              (-) 5.253640 
USLP(t) 1,2,3            (N) 1                  (+) 1,5 2.764862 
D) EURD, USRD, USLP 
EURD(t-i)  Sign USRD(t-i)  Sign USLP(t-i)  Sign SBIC3V
EURD(t) 1,4 4,6               (+) 1,6              (+) 4.385553 
USRD(t) 1,3               (-) 6 3,4              (+) 5.064726 
USLP(t) 1,2,3            (-) 2                  (-) 1 1.846757 
Source: Author’s calculations. The sign of the estimated coefficients are shown under the 
header “Sign” in parentheses (.) only if they are (jointly) statistically significant at least 
at 5 per cent level. (N) stands for the cases of “neutrality”.  
The entries in Table 4 can be read in a similar way to Table 2. For 
example, the trivariate system involving EURD, USRD, and USLP (first entry 
under D) is specified as EURDt = α + β1EURDt-1 + β2EURDt-4 + β3USRDt-4 + 
β4USRDt-6 + β5USLPt-1 + β6USLPt-6 with the resulting Schwarz BIC (SBIC3V) 
value of 4.385553. Note that the SBIC3V value is less than the bivariate 
specification between the EURD and the USRD (SBIC2V = 4.512524). The sum 
of the coefficients (β3 + β4) on USRD is positive, as indicated in parentheses. 
They are found to be jointly significant by means of the Wald test. The same case 
is also established for the sign and the joint significance of the (β5 + β6) 
coefficients on the USLP variable. These findings indicate that EURD is Granger-
caused by USRD and USLP and the signs of these causal relationships are 
positive. The (N) sign in the Table indicates that the sum of the estimated 
coefficients is not statistically different than zero, but the SBIC value obtained 
from the trivariate specification is less than the bi variate specification. 
The entries in Table 5 can also be read similar to those in Table 4, but the 
specifications are extended into a 4-variate framework. SBIC4V denotes the value 
of the Schwarz BIC in the best 4-variate transfer function specification.  
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TABLE 5   THE SPECIFICATION AND THE ESTIMATION RESULTS OF 
THE 4-VARIATE MODEL 
EURD(t-i)  Sign  USRD(t-i)   Sign  EULP(t-i)   Sign  USLP(t-i)  Sign SBIC4V
EURD 1,4,5 2                   (+) 1,5,6             (-) 1,4              (+) 3.693182
USRD 3,4,6             (-) 6 1,5,6             (+) 1,5,6           (-) 3.994254
EULP 4,6                (N) 1,2,3,4,5,6    (-) 1,4 2,5              (+) 0.694562
USLP 1,2,6             (-) 3                   (+) 5,6                (-) 1,5 1.588105
Source: Author’s calculations. The sign of the estimated coefficients are shown under the 
header “Sign” in parentheses (.) only if they are (jointly) statistically significant at least 
at 5 per cent level. (N) stands for the cases of “neutrality”.  
Table 6 presents the summary of all Granger-causality test results from bi-, 
tri-, and 4-variate models in qualitative terms. The results presented in Table 6 
provide a rich ground for discussion both in terms of possible linkages (or lack 
thereof) and also the status of the causal relationships. For example, the only 
robust results for both the existence of a causal relationship and its estimated sign 
are obtained for: (1) EURD → USRD (-), (2) EURD → USLP (-), (3) USRD →
EURD (+), and (4) USLP→ EURD (+), where the “→” sign shows the direction 
of Granger-Hsiao causality and the (.) shows the sign of the causal relationship. In 
the remaining cases, the presence of causal linkages and / or their direction are not 
found to be invariant to the exclusion and inclusions additional variables. These 
relationships appear to be spurious and they do not pass the criteria set in a 
multivariate framework of analysis. However, further investigations might be 
necessary to clarify the “neutrality” cases as more data become available in the 
future. This is because the “neutrality” does not mean “no causality” but it rather 
arises due to the sign reversals in the causal lag structures.  
16
Global Economy Journal, Vol. 7 [2007], Iss. 4, Art. 1
DOI: 10.2202/1524-5861.1301
TABLE 6.  SUMMARY OF THE CAUSAL FINDINGS FROM BI- AND 
MULTI-VARIATE SYSTEMS 
Causal 
Relationship 
Bivariate 
Model 
Trivariate Model 
(Sign), third variable in the system 
4-Variate 
Model 
EURD → EULP Neutrality (-), USRD Neutrality, USLP Neutrality 
EURD → USRD (-) (-), EULP (-), USLP (-) 
EURD → USLP (-) (-), USRD (-), EULP (-) 
EULP→ EURD None (-), USRD Neutrality, USLP (-) 
EULP→ USRD (-) (-), EURD (-), USLP (+) 
EULP→ USLP Neutrality (+), EURD Neutrality, USRD (-) 
USRD→ EURD (+) (+), EULP (+), USLP (+) 
USRD→ EULP (+) (-), EURD (-), USLP (-) 
USRD→ USLP None (-), EURD (+), EULP (+) 
USLP→ EURD (+) (+), EULP (+), USRD (+) 
USLP→ EULP None Neutrality, EURD (+), USRD (+) 
USLP→ USRD (-) (-), EULP (+), EURD (-) 
Source: Author’s calculations based on results reported in Tables 2-5. Please note that the variable 
names indicated in the columns for the trivariate models indicate which third variable is present in 
the model. 
At this point, we summarise the main results obtained and suggest answers 
to the questions asked in the Introduction.10 
1) R&D effort in the EU is a direct Granger-cause of R&D productivity in 
the US with a negative sign. That is, the reaction of the R&D effort in the US to 
an increase in EU’s R&D productivity is found to be submissive – using Scherer’s 
(1991) terminology. This robust result extends the similar previous findings 
between the US and Japan’s R&D interactions into the context of the US and the 
EU. 
                                                          
10
 Since the R&D activity showed ups and downs both in the EU and in the US in our sample 
period, it is important to note that the findings from the causality tests are meant to be taken as 
results holding true on average during period under investigation. Furthermore, in interpreting the 
causal evidence presented in this paper, it should also be noted that all variables are expressed as 
deviations from their long-run linear trend. Thus, a “decrease” in this context does not necessarily 
mean a negative value for the variable in question. It could as well represent a positive but below 
the long-term trend growth rate.  
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2) An increase in the R&D productivity in the US leads to an increase in 
the EU’s R&D productivity. This is also a robust result, which holds across all 
settings, and satisfies the Granger-Hsiao definition of direct causality. This 
finding is also in line with the literature on R&D games that the follower benefits 
from the leader.  
3) The R&D productivity in the EU is found to be a direct Granger-cause 
of the US total economy labour productivity, and the sign of the relationship is 
negative. As seen in Figure 6, a negative relationship is also visible in a 
scatterplot of USLP and EURD.  
FIGURE 6. SCATTERPLOT OF LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY 
        IN THE US AND R&D IN THE EU 
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This finding relates to the literature on the effects of foreign R&D on 
domestic productivity. In particular, the negative effect of EURD on USLP is 
puzzling and it contradicts, for example, the results reported by Coe and Helpman 
(1995), who argued for positive foreign R&D spillovers on domestic (total factor) 
productivity. Nevertheless, the results of Coe and Helpman have been weakened 
by Kao, Chiang, and Chen (1999) who showed that the estimation method of Coe 
and Helpman contains a bias and the bias-corrected results on the effects of 
foreign R&D on domestic productivity are rather weak. It should be noted that 
Coe and Helpman’s estimations cover the period from 1971 to 1990 while we 
investigate the 1979 – 2002 period. Indeed, an inspection of the Figures 1 and 4 
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for USLP and EURD suggests the presence of a negative relationship especially 
in the 1990s. This is consistent with our finding of a negative causal effect from 
EURD to USRD coupled with a positive reaction of USLP to USRD (e.g. in the 
4-variate model). That is, as EURD increases, the USRD decreases, which in turn 
leads to a decrease in USLP. In view of these findings, the present study adds to 
the R&D literature by first illustrating the possibility of a negative relationship 
between foreign R&D and domestic productivity (as in Figure 5) and then 
presenting causal evidence in favour of it in a multivariate framework. 
Nevertheless, the effects of R&D activity in the EU on the labour productivity in 
the US require further research using up-to-date R&D data by source (e.g., public, 
private, defence) and at the sectoral level. 
4) There is no conclusive evidence on direct causality from domestic R&D 
activity on domestic labour productivity growth. However, a possible indirect 
effect is still suggested by the finding that USRD does not Granger-cause USLP 
in the bivariate model but the causal impact of USRD on USLP is positive in the 
4-variate model. As a result, the increase in the R&D productivity in the US and 
the factors driving it might have contributed to the post-1997 increase in the 
economy-wide labour productivity in the US. In the case of EU, the causal 
relationships between domestic R&D and labour productivity are rather complex. 
While there is evidence of a causal link from R&D to labour productivity, the lag 
structure of this relationship involves both positive and negative coefficients and 
leads to an overall neutrality result within our sample period. Several explanations 
for this finding can be offered. First, as Cameron (2005) argues, in a leader-
follower game of R&D, the follower may face slower (productivity) growth as it 
needs to invest into genuine R&D (not just imitation and capital deepening) as the 
technological distance to the leader narrows. Therefore, a negative relationship 
between R&D spending and productivity growth might indeed be detected. 
Hence, our results indicating a complex relationship between the R&D activity 
and labour productivity in the EU might be partly reflecting the dynamics during 
the catching-up process. Secondly, the source of R&D is an important 
consideration. Guellec and Van Pottelsberg de la Potterie (2004), among others, 
suggest that defense R&D leads to negative spillovers, and the domestic 
productivity spillovers from business R&D are higher than those of public R&D. 
Since we use aggregate EU15 R&D data from all sources, our findings might be 
capturing the possibly differential effects of different R&D-sources on overall 
productivity. In this context, if achieved, the Lisbon target that two-thirds of the 
R&D expenditures should be business R&D would help enhance the positive 
spillovers from R&D activity on the EU’s overall labour productivity. Third, 
Carlsson and Mudambi (2003) argue that the extent of R&D spillovers on 
domestic productivity depends on the degree of absorptive capacity, the degree of 
homogeneity of R&D activity location, and the extent of intra-regional linkages. 
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Looking at our results in this respect, the aggregate nature of our R&D dataset 
may again explain the rather unclear findings. For the EU, we use R&D data from 
15 countries and the fact is that the distribution of R&D is rather heterogeneous 
across EU countries. The distribution of the R&D by location is skewed also in 
the case of the US, possibly limiting the extent of aggregate gains from R&D 
activity. Overall, our results from aggregate R&D and labour productivity data 
support the theoretical and institutional arguments that the effects of R&D activity 
on domestic labour productivity might indeed be ambiguous. While there is some 
evidence of positive spillovers, the actual dynamics are more complex. 
IV. CONCLUSIONS 
In this study, we examine the domestic and international linkages among R&D 
productivity and economy-wide labour productivity in the EU (before the 
enlargements in 2004 and 2007) and the US using multivariate Granger-causality 
tests. We find that R&D in the EU is a direct Granger-Hsiao cause of R&D and 
labour productivity in the US, and the signs of these effects are negative. The EU, 
on the other hand, shows a positive reaction to the increased R&D productivity in 
the US and also enjoys positive spillovers from increases in labour productivity in 
the US. As such, our findings identify the direction of causality in the observed 
negative correlation between the R&D activity in the EU and the R&D activity in 
the US. In Scherer’s (1991) terms, the US is found to be responding rather 
submissively when R&D effort increases in the EU, while EU’s reaction to an 
increase in R&D efforts by the US is on the aggressive side. The aggressive 
reaction by the EU reflects itself in different forms, for example, by the gains 
made in basic research results (e.g., increased share of top 1% publications and 
citations) even when the R&D activity was stagnating in the EU.  
Nevertheless, it should be kept in mind that the findings of this study are 
based on aggregate R&D data from all sources. There are differences in the 
composition of R&D between the US and the EU – e.g., the share of public R&D 
in total R&D expenditures is higher in the EU. Indeed, the EU’s Lisbon targets 
envisage an increase in the share of private R&D in total R&D expenditures to 
about 66% from the current levels of about 55%. Therefore, an empirical 
investigation of whether there is a difference between the responses of public and 
private R&D in the EU (US) to public and private R&D in the US (EU) remains 
to be undertaken.  
The empirical findings of our study as well as the results of other macro-
and micro-level studies in the literature share the view that the US’s R&D 
reaction to the aggressive R&D efforts by competitors is generally submissive. 
Hence, if the EU can make progress towards achieving its ambitious R&D targets 
(possibly at a later date than 2010), the chances of achieving the Lisbon vision 
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remains good. Still, the achievement of the R&D targets of the Lisbon strategy for 
the enlarged EU will also depend on the ability of the new member states to spend 
more financial resources on R&D as well as to change its structure by sources. 
APPENDIX 
The following is a parameterized application of Hsiao’s (1982) definitions of 
different types of causal relationships in a 4-variable framework.  
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The causal relationship between X and Y can take one of the following forms. 
Direct Causality.  
a) ∑δ1i  ≠ 0, when ∑φ1i  ≠ 0 and ∑λ1i  ≠ 0; (in a 4-variable system) 
b) ∑δ1i  ≠ 0, when ∑φ1i  ≠ 0 and ∑λ1i  = 0; (in a 3-variable system) 
c) ∑δ1i  ≠ 0, when ∑φ1i  = 0 and ∑λ1i  ≠ 0; (in a 3-variable system) 
d) ∑δ1i  ≠ 0, when ∑φ1i  = 0 and ∑λ1i  = 0; (in a bi-variate system) 
That is, X should cause Y in a bivariate system and in all multivariate systems. 
Direct causality from X to Y is represented as X ⇒ Y. 
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Feedback. If X ⇒ Y and Y ⇒ X, then there is direct feedback between X and Y.  
Or, X ⇔ Y 
No Causality.  
a) ∑δ1i  = 0, when ∑φ1i  = 0 and ∑λ1i  = 0; (sufficient condition) 
b) if ∑δ1i  = 0 but ∑φ1i  ≠ 0 and ∑λ1i  = 0 and if ∑δ3i  = 0 in all bi- and multivariate 
settings that involve X to explain M, 
c) if ∑δ1i  = 0 but ∑λ1i  ≠ 0 and ∑φ1i  =  0 and if ∑δ4i  = 0 in all bi- and multivariate 
settings that involve X to explain Z, 
d) if ∑δ1i  = 0 but ∑φ1i  ≠ 0 and ∑λ1i  ≠ 0 and if ∑δ3i  = 0 and ∑δ4i  = 0 in all bi- 
and multivariate settings that involve X to explain M and Z, then, there is no 
causality from X to Y (directly or indirectly). 
That is, for X not to be a Granger-cause of Y in any way, X should not cause Y 
directly or indirectly. 
Type I Spurious Causality.  
If ∑δ1i  ≠ 0, when ∑φ1i  ≠ 0 and/or ∑λ1i  ≠ 0 in a 4- variable system,  but ∑δ1i  = 0 
when ∑φ1i  = 0 and/or  ∑λ1i  = 0 (i.e. in a bi-variate system),  then X is said to 
cause Y spuriously. 
This situation may arise if M and/or Y (together or individually) is/are pre- or co-
requires for X to cause Y.  
Indirect Causality.   
If ∑δ1i = 0 when ∑φ1i ≠ 0 and/or ∑λ1i ≠ 0, but X ⇒ M and / or X ⇒ Z. 
Furthermore, ∑δ1i ≠0 when ∑φ1i = 0 and ∑λ1i = 0. Then, X is an indirect, but not 
spurious, cause of Y. This case is denoted by X → Y. 
In this case, X causes Y via other variables for which it is a direct cause of. Note 
that the X should cause in a bivariate system or in multivariate systems. 
Type II Spurious Causality.  
a) the no-causality conditions in (3) hold, except that ∑δ1i ≠0 in a bivariate 
Granger-causality test between X and Y.  
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b) Furthermore, M ⇒ X and M ⇒ Y and / or Z ⇒ X and Z ⇒ Y. Then, there is 
Type II spurious causality from X to Y. The case can be similarly derived for Z. 
This case may arise if, for example, M (Z) is a direct Granger-cause of both X and 
Y. Then, in the absence of M (Z) (say, in a bivariate causality test between X and Y), 
X is found to Granger-cause Y, when this result is indeed due to a missing common 
cause.  
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